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Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to consider the relationship between entry and social welfare 
in the Japanese insurance market. This paper has explained the entry problem using the Salop model 
and provided some meaningful results. The important results in this paper are as follows: 
(1) The number of insurance firms with no regulations is more than the number of insurance 
firms which achieve the socially desirable outcome (already described in Salop (1979)). 
(2) The upper price regulation can achieve the socially desirable outcome. 
(3) It may be difficult and ineffective for the regulator to institute the upper price regulation in 
the Japanese insurance market because the fixed entry cost is relatively large. 
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Since 1996, a lot of insurance firms are entering into the Japanese insurance market. The reason 
they enter into in recent years is to relax the entry barriers. It is most well-known example that the 
life insurance firms could enter into the non-life insurance market and the non-life insurance firms 
could enter into the life insurance market. Thus, although there were 31 life insurance firms and 27 
non-life insurance firms as of April 1, 19951, there are 42 life insurance firms and 57 non-life 
insurance firms as of June 30, 20032. 
According to the perfect competition model, an increase in the number of insurance firms also 
increases social welfare. But there are many reasons why the Japanese insurance market should not 
be referred as perfect. For example, there are still some regulations such as capital and price 
regulations in order to limit the cutthroat competition. Even if there were tremendous numbers of 
insurance firms, each insurance firm may sell the differentiated insurance product in order to avoid 
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1 See “Life Insurance in Japan (Fact Book), 1995” and “Non-Life Insurance in Japan (Fact Book), 
1995”. We do not count in Axa Life Insurance Company because it begun to operate in Japan at 
April 1, 1995. 
2 See http://www.fsa.go.jp/news/newsj/15/sonota/f-20030918-1b/118-123.pdf 
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the fierce competition3. Thus, it is not clear whether an increase in the number of insurance firms is 
socially desirable in the insurance market. Furthermore, if an increase in the number of insurance 
firms may decrease social welfare, we have one question: what should the regulator do in order to 
realize socially desirable outcome?  
The purpose of this paper is to consider the above question. To do so, we would briefly sketch 
Salop (1979) as follows. According to Salop’s results, if the regulator does not institute regulations at 
all, then there are too many insurance firms in view of social welfare. Thus, the regulator has to 
institute some regulations in order to achieve the socially desirable outcome. The conclusion of this 
paper is that maintaining the price level not to be excessive is an effective way to achieve the 
socially desirable outcome. 
 
Ⅱ. Excess entry theorem: the Salop model4
  Let assume that there are a lot of consumers in the insurance market. All consumers have any ideal 
point which is indicated by most desirable insurance product. Each ideal point may refer as his or her 
subjective product measurement. Thus, the consumers have different ideal point. For simplicity, 
these ideal points are assumed to be uniformly distributed on a circular market depicted by Figure 1. 









Figure 1: The curcular market
 
                                                        
3 Schlesinger-Schulenburg (1991), Gravell (1994) and Tsutsui et al. (2000) have analyzed a 
horizontal differentiated insurance market which is associated with variety (product characteristics). 
Okura (2003a) has analyzed a vertical differentiated insurance market which is associated with 
quality (after care level). 
4 Schlesinger-Schulenburg (1991) has already used the Salop model in order to analyze the entry 
problem in the insurance market. But, they have not considered the case where the regulator may 
institute some regulations. 
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The consumer whose ideal insurance product is denoted by x  has the following utility function: 
 
     ii xxppu −−−=                                             ---(1) 
 
where p  represents the reservation price for insurance product and is assumed to be sufficient high. 
Thus, all consumers always purchase one unit of insurance product. For simplicity, we eliminate the 
possibility where some consumers purchase more than one unit of insurance product.  and  
are the price and variety of the insurance product sold by insurance firm , respectively. It is 
assumed that all insurance firms sell only one insurance product and they cannot charge different 
prices to consumers with different varieties. So the insurance firm  submits only one insurance 




{ }iii px ,≡δ . 
  Each insurance firm has the following profit function: 
 
     FDp iii −=π                                                  ---(2) 
 
where  is the demand for insurance firm i  and  denotes the fixed entry cost. The all 
insurance firms have an identical fixed entry cost. In contrast, the variable cost of the insurance 
product is negligible. 
iD F
  Salop (1979) set out a two stage game as follows: In the first stage, potential insurance firms 
decide whether he enters into the insurance market or not. In the second stage, they choose their 
prices simultaneously in order to compete with rival insurance firms which entered into the previous 
stage. Let  be the number of insurance firms which exist at the beginning of the second stage. n
Assume also that the insurance firms are located symmetrically and so the distance from the 
insurance firm to the neighborhood insurance firm is equal to n1 . Thus, in fact, the insurance firm 
 can only consider his two (left and right side of) neighborhood insurance firms despite he 
competes with all rival insurance firms. Let denote 
i
x~  be the marginal consumer who feels 
indifferent between purchasing from insurance firm  and from his neighborhood insurance firm. 
Then, formally the marginal consumer 
i
x~  is given by 
 








1ˆ~                                            ---(3) 
 
where  represents the price of neighborhood insurance firm. Thus,  p̂
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= .                                             ---(4) 
 
The insurance firm  is able to have his demand i x~  from both sides. The demand for insurance 
firm  can be written as i
 
     ii pn
pxD −+== 1ˆ~2 .                                          ---(5) 
 
Therefore, the profit function of the insurance firm  can be expressed as i
 








1ˆπ .                                      ---(6) 
 
The insurance firm  chooses his price  to maximize his profit given the prices of other 
insurance firms. 
i ip
Next, we seek a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. This equilibrium can be derived by backward 
induction (see Selten (1975)). At the second stage, it shows that given the number of insurance firms, 
all insurance firms set the price simultaneously. 












.                                         ---(7) 
 
Since all insurance firms have identical cost structure, we are sufficient to search for a symmetric 
equilibrium which can be denoted by pppp n ≡=== Λ21 . Hence, the equilibrium price is 
given by 
 




=∗ .                                                    ---(8) 
 
Thus, when the number of insurance firms is close to infinite, that is, ∞→n , then the equilibrium 
price is close to zero. In other words, the perfect competitive equilibrium realizes because the 
equilibrium price is equal to marginal cost. However, by the equation (8), this equilibrium never 
realizes unless the fixed entry cost is zero (or negligible). If the fixed entry cost is strictly positive, 
finite number of insurance firms only enters into the market and the equilibrium price is always 
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above marginal cost. 
Let consider the first stage. Suppose that the number of insurance firms is determined from zero 
profit condition. Substituting the equation (8) in (6), the zero profit condition can be expressed as 
 
012 =−= Fni
π .                                               ---(9) 
 
Equation (9) yields 
 
     
F
n 1=∗ .                                                    ---(10) 
 
However, we do not know whether the number of insurance firms indicated by the equation (10) is 
socially desirable or not. The more the number of insurance firms, the more the number of varieties. 
Thus, an increase in the number of insurance firms increases the consumer welfare. But at the same 
time, an increase in the number of insurance firms also increase the total fixed entry cost. Thus, an 
increase in the number of insurance firms reduces the producer welfare. So in order to check whether 
the number of insurance firms indicated by the equation (10) is socially desirable or not, we need to 
calculate the number of insurance firms which minimize the sum of the fixed entry cost and 
consumer disutility which is occurred by the discrepancy between ideal product and purchased 
product.  
Let  be the number of insurance firms which achieve the socially desirable outcome. Then, 








































= .                                                   ---(12) 
 
Thus, in comparison with the equation (10) and the equation (12), we conclude that the number of 
insurance firms with no regulations is more than the number of insurance firms which achieve the 
socially desirable outcome. 
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Ⅲ. The upper price regulation 
  In the previous section, if the regulator does not institute regulations at all and the fixed entry cost 
is not negligible, socially desirable outcome never realizes. In order to achieve the socially desirable 
outcome, the regulator has to institute some regulations. 
  One very simple way to achieve the socially desirable outcome is to institute the entry regulation 
which sets the maximum number of the insurance firms in the insurance market. It is easy to verify 
that the regulator can realize the socially desirable outcome, that is, the regulator sets the maximum 
number of the insurance firms is equal to the number of them in the socially desirable outcome. But 
actually the regulator may not institute this sort of entry regulation because the Japanese insurance 
law basically permits new entry unless there are some critical problems such as capital shortage and 
so on. Thus, the regulator may consider other way to realize the socially desirable outcome. 
  Let us demonstrate the relationship between the number of insurance firms and the price 
regulation. Suppose that the regulator institutes the price regulation which specifies the feasible price 
. The regulator chooses this price both which is satisfied with zero profit condition and which 









iπ .                                             ---(13) 
 
Substituting the equation (12) in the equation (13), it can be seen that 
 
     
2
FpU = .                                                   ---(14) 
 
Thus, if the regulator introduces the price regulation in accordance with the equation (14), the 
socially desirable outcome achieves.  
  The above argument may lead us to feel doubt. The regulator cannot decide only one price and 
prohibit choosing other prices nowadays. Instead, the regulator may be able to maintain the price 
level not to be excessive. In other words, the regulator may be able to introduce  as “upper” 
regulated price. When the regulator introduces not the one price regulation, that is,  but 
the upper price regulation, that is, , can the regulator achieve socially desirable outcome? 
In order to check above description, we have to prove that no insurance firm has any incentive to cut 





  Suppose that one representative insurance firm j  lowers his price from  to Up [ )Uj pp ,0∈ . 
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pp 1π .                                      ---(15) 
 
Therefore, the insurance firm j ’s profit maximization problem yields the first order condition given 
by 
 










.                                        ---(16) 
 
To investigate whether the insurance firm j  has incentive to cut price or not, it needs to confirm 
whether the equation (16) at  is positive or not. In this case, Uj pp =
 
















.                              ---(17) 
 
Because the equation (17) becomes positive, the insurance firm j  always lower his profit if he 
lowers his price from . Therefore, no insurance firm has incentive to cut his price. Figure 2 
summarizes the above discussion. 
Up
  Finally, we can analyze effects of changes in fixed entry cost (exogenous variable) in order to 
check the relationship between the price regulation and the fixed entry cost. The following properties 





















.                                     ---(19) 
 
According to the equations (18) and (19), when the fixed entry cost is relatively high, the difference 
between  and  becomes large and difference between  and  becomes small. In this ∗p Up ∗n Sn
 7
International Review of Business, Vol.7, pp.61-68, March, 2004. 
case, to institute the upper price regulation is not only difficult but also ineffective. In reality, to enter 
into the insurance market, new entrants incur large fixed costs of investment. For example, potential 
entrants must prepare their distribution systems and/or educate their employees before they can sell 
their insurance products in the Japanese insurance market. Hence, we conclude that it may be 














Fnpi = (zero profit condition)
U




= (equilibrium price without regulation)
n
ip
Figure 2: The results
notes:
∗E : The equlibrium point without regulation
: The socially desirable point without regulation
  (This point is not the equlibrium point)





  This paper has explained the entry problem using the Salop model and provided some meaningful 
results. The important results in this paper are as follows: 
(1) The number of insurance firms with no regulations is more than the number of insurance 
firms which achieve the socially desirable outcome (already described in Salop (1979)). 
(2) The upper price regulation can achieve the socially desirable outcome. 
                                                        
5 Okura (2003b) has analyzed the relationship between the entry and fixed entry cost when the 
incumbent insurance firm can choose the entry deterrence strategy. 
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(3) It may be difficult and ineffective for the regulator to institute the upper price regulation in 
the Japanese insurance market because the fixed entry cost is relatively large. 
 
References 
  Gravell, Hugh (1994), “Remunerating Information Providers: Commissions versus Fees in Life 
Insurance,” Journal of Risk and Insurance 61, 425-457. 
  Okura, Mahito (2003a), “An Equilibrium Analysis of the Insurance Market with Vertical 
Differentiation,” Research Paper, Heubner Foundation and Geneva Association. 
  Okura, Mahito (2003b), “An Entry Deterrence Strategy for Insurers,” The 7th Annual Asia-Pacific 
Risk and Insurance Association (APRIA) Conference. 
  Salop, Steven C. (1979), “Monopolistic Competition with Outside Goods,” Bell Journal of 
Economics 10, 141-156. 
Schlesinger, Harris and J.-Matthias Graf von der Schlenburg (1991), “Search Costs, Switching 
Costs and Product Heterogeneity in an Insurance Market,” Journal of Risk and Insurance 58, 
109-119. 
  Selten, Reinhard (1975), “Reexamination of the Perfectness Concept for Equilibrium Points in 
Extensive Games,” International Journal of Game Theory 4, 25-55. 
  Tsutsui, Yoshio, Masahiko Sekiguchi and Tsutomu Chano (2000), “The Premium-Dividend 
Competition in the Prewar Japanese Life Insurance Industry: A Game-Theoretic Interpretation,” 
Japanese Economic Review 51, 519-535. 
 
 9
